



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIII, No. 24

MARCH 31, 1944

## PUBLIC SEEKS CLARIFICATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

IT is not a mere coincidence that on both sides of the Atlantic the public is questioning President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill about their foreign policy. Nor is this questioning, which daily grows in volume, merely a captious effort to discredit the war leaders of the respective countries, as is sometimes claimed. On the contrary, except for irresponsibles who are always found on the fringe of any society in time of crisis, it reflects genuine concern about the future—about the way in which the United States and Britain propose to use victory once it has been achieved.

This is a natural concern, which cannot be answered either by frivolous jests or by pleas for postponement of discussion until the conflict is over. When democratic nations ask citizens to sacrifice their lives for the common good, the men themselves, and their families and friends, have the right to call within the limits of the possible for constant clarification of the aims served by this sacrifice. Nor is it realistic to insist on delay of post-war problems until hostilities are over when it is obvious to the merest neophyte that the problems of boundaries and political régimes in Europe, to give but two examples, are being settled in the course of the war itself.

**WHAT WE CANNOT EXPECT.** There are, of course, certain things which the public, in the very nature of things, cannot expect the government to do, either here or in Britain. We cannot expect military or political leaders to reveal, on the eve of an invasion which, if it were not successful, would prove a tragic catastrophe, the details of military plans concerted among the United Nations. Nor does the public expect to receive daily bulletins from the diplomatic front. President Wilson's famous phrase, "open covenants openly arrived at," represents an aspiration which cannot, in practice, be achieved in most transactions among human beings, let alone nations. Nor does any reasonable person expect that per-

fect solutions will be found overnight for every one of the complex problems of international relations, greatly accentuated by the war. It is also generally understood—and Mr. Churchill pointed this out in his address to the House of Commons on February 22—that by very reason of the fact that the United Nations are engaged in a coalition war each must, in varying degree, according to given circumstances, adjust its respective policies to those of others. The best we can hope for is a workable compromise between the conflicting interests of members of the anti-Axis coalition, each of whom is doing its best to consolidate its position in anticipation of victory.

**WHAT WE CAN EXPECT.** In working out each successive compromise we must, of course, be constantly aware of the fact that a dictatorship like that of Stalin is in a far easier position to make clear-cut decisions on foreign policy than a democratic government like that of Britain or the United States, which must take into account the extent to which this or that course may win the approval of the people and the support of its political opponents. But, with all these qualifications, there is still legitimate reason for public concern—as distinguished from idle curiosity or partisan quibbling—regarding the application of the basic assumptions of our foreign policy. People cannot but recall that, before 1939, we also officially proclaimed our adherence to the ideals of international collaboration yet, when it came to specific issues, Britain and the United States acted again and again as if they had never heard of these ideals. True, in this respect the Anglo-Americans were no worse than other nations. The trouble was however that, to a far greater extent than other nations, they did create the impression that their conduct would be guided by moral concepts.

In extenuation for this discrepancy between theory

and practice, the plea has been made that the governments of the two countries were powerless during the inter-war years to move ahead of their peoples who, admittedly, feared war, and acquiesced in successive compromises to avoid it. But if this plea is tenable, then there is all the more reason today why the leaders of the two great Western democracies should try to enlist the support of public opinion for the main lines of policy they propose to follow. Like all human beings, they have made mistakes in the past—not merely on details, but on interpretation of fundamental trends in world affairs; and there is no guarantee that they will not make mistakes in the future. Errors in judgment are costly

in all spheres of activity; in international affairs they can cost millions of lives. Far from being resentful of the widespread discussion aroused by international issues in Britain and the United States, the governments of the two countries should welcome this evidence of greater public interest in what are for all of us matters of life and death, and encourage the formation of intelligent opinion. For it is only with the understanding, not the blind, support of public opinion that Britain and the United States can finally succeed in translating copy-book maxims about world collaboration into concrete workaday measures.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## WILL JAPANESE INVASION BREAK POLITICAL DEADLOCK IN INDIA?

The battle of Burma which, as Prime Minister Churchill warned on March 26, "is not by any means decided yet," presents an involved picture of simultaneous Allied and enemy offensives conducted on widely separated fronts. In the Arakan region—the western coastal area adjoining India—troops of the Indian Army have been making slow progress in the direction of the Burmese port of Akyab, which was the object of an unsuccessful British drive in the winter of 1942-43. Five hundred miles to the north several other United Nations forces are gradually converging on the Japanese base at Myitkyina in a campaign executed with great skill under Lieutenant General Stilwell in accordance with decisions reached at the Quebec conference of August 1943.

**ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN THE NORTH.** The strategy now being pursued against the Japanese in Burma is one of limited objectives, but some of the goals are of considerable importance. This is particularly true of Myitkyina, whose fall would make air transport from northeast India to China a much safer, easier task, by eliminating some of the dangerous flying over extremely high mountains now necessary to avoid Japanese planes. At the same time, progress of the supply road under construction from Ledo in India across northern Burma to China would be facilitated.

The taking of Myitkyina is an international task, involving Chinese, American, British, Indian, Gurkha and Kachin troops. The Chinese, trained in India with American equipment, probably form the largest group, and have demonstrated clearly their ability, when given modern weapons and training, not only to hold the enemy but to drive him back. On March 7 they effected a junction with American troops in north Burma. This followed by two days the landing of British-Indian airborne troops, supplied by American air transport and glider units, some distances to the south of Myitkyina in a daring move which threatened Japanese supply routes to the forces in that city. Meanwhile, north of Myitkyina, British offi-

cers have been leading forces composed of Gurkha soldiers from the state of Nepal and Kachin tribesmen from Burma.

**JAPANESE INVADE INDIA.** The Japanese have replied to the various Allied actions by launching a three-pronged drive across the Indian frontier, apparently with the immediate objective of taking Imphal, capital of the British Indian state of Manipur. The situation in this area is extremely unclear, but it would be a grave error at present to assume that the Japanese do not have serious military intentions. For if they could take Imphal and then march up the all-weather highway from that city to the Assam-Bengal railway, they would cut the key supply line servicing Stilwell's troops in north Burma and the plane traffic with China. The enemy is, of course, a long way from accomplishing this, and its shortage of aircraft will present serious difficulties. Yet the objective is one for which Tokyo undoubtedly would be willing to pay a heavy price. Despite the many setbacks suffered by Japan in the Pacific, the Japanese army has been relatively untouched in the actions so far conducted by the Allies and, in manpower and training, is probably more powerful than before Pearl Harbor. Moreover, as Prime Minister Churchill remarked, the Japanese fleet, although unwilling to face the American Navy in the Pacific, may seek action in Indian waters.

There is no indication that Japanese actions in the Indian theatre will take United Nations military leaders by surprise. Not only did Mr. Churchill allude on March 26 to the presence in that area of "a powerful battle fleet under Admiral Somerville," but more than three months ago, on December 13, 1943, in a broadcast which appears not to have been recalled in recent days, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in India, declared that a land invasion of India was quite possible. "So far," he said, "the Japanese have never crossed our land frontiers, but that is not because they could not do so. . . . They may yet try something of this kind in an attempt to

cause alarm and in order to assist their propaganda, but they can do us no real harm in this way. They might even try to land small parties on our coasts . . . I assure you that we are constantly considering these possibilities and how to deal with them, should they materialise."

**POSSIBLE POLITICAL GAINS.** The political aspects of the invasion of India have been highlighted by Premier Tojo's statement of March 22 that Japan expects to "repulse the enemy military forces and put India completely in the hands of the Indians." He referred to two of Japan's propaganda weapons in the struggle for Indian opinion: the possibility of establishing a Free India Provisional Government on conquered Indian land, and to the use of the "Indian National Army" in the campaign. This army, organized by Tokyo under the leadership of the pro-Axis Indian leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, is said to be operating together with Japanese troops in the drive on Imphal. The "Provisional Government," also led by Bose, was established last fall in Singapore and later transferred to Burma. If the Japanese can carve out for themselves an area of land on India's eastern border, they may be expected to move the "Provisional Government" to Indian soil.

There is no way of estimating what effect propaganda of this type may have in India but, even though the so-called Indian National Army is presumably small in numbers, there is little reason for complacency. The Indian situation remains a stalemate, with the country quiet, but the main political parties dissatisfied. The official British attitude, as reiterated by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, on February 17, is that the Congress leaders must renounce their non-recognition policy before they can be released and that Indian groups must reach agreement among themselves before any transfer of political power can take place. The Indians appear, however, to be unlikely, for a variety of reasons, to take either

of these steps solely on their own initiative, although they might respond to official proposals.

**A TIME FOR ACTION.** The situation is one that seems ripe for some new move by the Government of India, designed to break the deadlock. The Viceroy has stated that he would "like to have the cooperation" of the nationalists and that he does not seek to have the Congress put itself "in sackcloth and ashes." It would be thoroughly consistent with the moderate tone of these remarks if he would clarify the forms of cooperation that the Government has in mind and make it possible for the nationalist leaders and their organization to consult on this basis concerning changes in policy. The success of such actions, which could, at first, be of an exploratory, private character, might well be facilitated by the deep concern that must be arising among Indians over Japan's invasion of their national soil.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

*Report on India*, by T. A. Raman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1943. \$2.50

An Indian journalist finds himself in essential agreement with the official British position on current Indian affairs. In the political sections the author shows a marked tendency to overlook facts that do not fit in with his thesis, but there is no doubt as to the excellence of the non-political chapters dealing with Indian history and life.

*The Vatican and The War*, by Camille Ciarfarra. New York, Dutton, 1944. \$3.00

Correspondent's reminiscences of Rome before 1942—not always sticking close to the titular subject, toward which its attitude is sympathetic.

*The Long Balkan Night*, by Leigh White. New York, Scribner's, 1944. \$3.50

Intelligent first-hand account of the impact of the Nazi army on Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece during 1940-41.

*China Handbook, 1937-1943*. Compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information. New York, Macmillan, 1943. \$5.00

An over-all factual survey of Chinese affairs during the past six years, covering such subjects as the Kuomintang, government structure, foreign relations, public finance, communications, courts and prisons, military affairs, education and research, industry and labor, mineral resources, the press, relief activities, and price control. Also included are a chronology of major events, a government directory, and a Chinese "Who's Who." Persons using this valuable reference work should bear in mind the fact that it is entirely official in its analysis of events and selection of subject matter.

*British Economic Interests in the Far East*, by E. M. Gull. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations in association with Oxford University Press, 1943. \$3.00

A carefully written account of Britain's Far Eastern stake, with strong emphasis on the detailed facts of the past hundred years. Invaluable for the student of Far Eastern affairs.

For a detailed discussion of one possible outlet for uprooted populations, read—

### THE AMAZON: A NEW FRONTIER?

by Earl Parker Hanson

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March issue of HEADLINE SERIES

Order from

Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38 St., New York 16.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 24, MARCH 31, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LERT, Secretary; VERA MICHLES DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.


F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

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# Washington News Letter



MARCH 27. — Criticisms last week by Wendell Willkie and Governor Thomas E. Dewey, each potentially a Republican nominee for the presidency, of the Washington Administration for its conduct of foreign affairs suggest that foreign policy will provide the coming campaign with one of its most sharply drawn issues.

**DISSATISFIED WITH FOREIGN POLICY.** Dissatisfaction regarding foreign policy in some quarters seems to spring from the impression that the Administration is either confusing promises with policy or that it is withholding essential information from the public. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull have pledged themselves in the past to uphold the principles of international collaboration (the Moscow Declaration), of democracy on a world-wide basis (Four Freedoms), and of national self-determination (Atlantic Charter), but so far the public can see little evidence that the pledges have been implemented in practice.

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have sought in a number of ways to quiet the growing demand for clear action in foreign affairs. The President, at his news conference of March 24, declared that we have a foreign policy even if some people don't think so. Mr. Hull issued a 17-point statement on foreign policy on March 22; expounded his views for more than two hours on March 24 to 23 Republican Representatives who have consistently favored international collaboration; announced that he will shortly deliver an address on foreign policy; and invited the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to confer with him after Easter on the development of a plan for fitting the United States into the world political organization envisaged by the Moscow Declaration.

As evidence of the Administration's direct and practical interest in world affairs, President Roosevelt on March 24 publicly requested the "free peoples of Europe and Asia" to admit refugees, particularly Jews oppressed in Nazi-held Europe, and Secretary Hull announced on March 25 that the United States would be represented at the conference of Allied Ministers of Education in London this spring.

Mr. Hull's 17-point statement represented an admirable outline of objectives (all of which had been set forth in Washington previously), but the Secretary refrained from filling in the details of the outline. In brief, he said national interest is the basis of foreign policy. He advocated international cooperation;

creation of an international agency that could keep the peace by force; settlement of international differences by discussion, negotiation, conciliation and good offices; settlement of international legal disputes in an international court; reduction of arms; acceptance of the Moscow Declaration; erasure of spheres of influence and alliances; surveillance over aggressor nations; lowering "excessive" trade barriers; stabilizing currencies; satisfaction of the Atlantic Charter with the reservation that each nation must "demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government"; continued acceptance of the principles of the sovereign equality of nations large or small, of nations' rights to choose their own form of government, and of non-intervention. He also expressed the view that a people willing to fight for liberty is entitled to liberty, and that free nations must prepare dependent peoples for "the responsibilities of self-government."

Mr. Roosevelt on March 24 added to the list when, in reading his statement on refugees, he said that its first paragraph was a very good answer to some people who are wandering around asking bell-hops whether we have a foreign policy. The paragraph said: "The United Nations are fighting to make a world in which tyranny and aggression cannot exist; a world based upon freedom, equality and justice; a world in which all persons regardless of race, color or creed may live in peace, honor and dignity."

**REPUBLICAN CRITICISMS.** The pressure for clarification of American foreign policy comes not only from political opponents of the President and from isolationists, but also from those who have favored international collaboration in the past. The point of view of the latter was summed up by Hal Holmes, of Washington, one of the 23 Republican Representatives who called on Mr. Hull. He said: "We haven't any definite policy except silence." It is essential, however, at this critical juncture to distinguish between the attacks made on President Roosevelt by Republican leaders for election purposes, and genuine criticism of certain specific policies of the Administration. Subsequent articles will analyze the controversies aroused by our policy on France and our interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, as well as measures already taken by the Administration in the direction of international collaboration.

BLAIR BOLLES

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